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## The Origin of Political Power

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### I

THE practical interest of the philosophical controversy on the origin of political power is that it enables us to discern the moral character of the essential obligations of civic life and of civic duty.

political society pretends to possess extensive rights over our whole existence; a public authority governs this political society and speaks to us in its name. But by what right is it lawful for this society and for this authority to impose upon us obligations of all sorts whose accomplishment makes heavy demands upon our purses, and at certain times requires the sacrifice even of our lives?

Doubtless many will reply that political society and the authority that governs it constitute a double *social contract* for which it is perfectly useless to seek a moral and rational justification, and that it is absolutely necessary for us to submit to it with common sense as to a necessity, however oppressive, absurd perhaps, and odious, but nevertheless inevitable. These would gladly say what was said during the Great War: *qu'il ne faut pas chercher à comprendre* (one need not try to understand).

But this is a solution sad and humiliating for the dignity of human nature—a solution alarming for the future of political society itself. For, if the sole reason for submitting to the exigencies of civic discipline is the practical impossibility of avoiding them without serious harm, all obligations of this very civic discipline will disappear when a sufficient number of the body politic have found the means of avoiding with impunity the most onerous demands of public authority. If the binding force is considered as a mere necessity of fact, merely demanding submission to the inevitable, it will be stripped of all its force the moment this necessity disappears, and submission to public authority no longer seems inevitable. But with the actual weakening of the social bonds, and with the increasing autonomy with which everyone seeks today to liberate himself from all galling and disagreeable restraints, one cannot seri-

ously deny that the chance of escaping with impunity the most burdensome obligations of civic discipline is a prospect which often presents itself to this or that individual, and even to entire classes, as perfectly within the scope of realization. As a consequence, nothing would any longer demand that the citizen should consider himself bound in conscience to submit to a social discipline which is displeasing and odious.

We are tending, therefore, to the breaking up of the principle of authority, and even to the dissolution of political society. Its obligation disappears by the sole fact that someone considers himself ingenious or strong enough to escape it without serious injury. Such is the worthlessness of the philosophical systems which try to explain the rights of political society and of public authority simply by a blind, unknown, inexplicable necessity, or by a power whose supremacy must be considered as unavoidable: the power of a resolute minority, imposing in one way or another its dictation upon all; or the power of the multitude, arguing from the law of numbers and from the inviolable right of majority. Such doctrines, regardless of the form they take, confuse a question of fact with a question of right. They do not make the prerogative of public authority a thing sacred in civic society; they show its character as tyrannical, abusive, morally unreal. All persist in saying that we must be obedient to authority because we can do nothing else but obey it. Not one of these theories gives to authority a philosophical foundation which assures it a moral nature, a spiritual stability, an objective title which requires the submission of conscience.

Instead of procuring for us a justification of public authority they content themselves with offering the law of the jungle as a model. They clearly postulate the principle in virtue of which public authority ceases to exist the very moment that someone finds the means of disobeying it with impunity. Certainly this is no explanation of the



principle of authority. It is the negation of the very concept of public authority and of the rights that are connected with it.

## II

The ideology of Rousseau, which is at the bottom of the political philosophy of the French Revolution, presents a superiority, which we will not deny, over all the theories whose essential sterility we have just indicated. It seeks to give to public authority an objective right, an obligatory principle, a moral character. Let us see if this doctrine is just, and if it answers to the true demands of the good of society.

According to Rousseau, the organization of men into a political society is not the result of an exigency of nature. If, as a matter of fact, men grouped together to form a political society, they took a step which was perfectly optional, an act of their free will. This was the *social contract*. The obligations of civic discipline became the legitimate object of the clauses of reciprocal agreements which gave birth to political society. Each individual, anxious to guard his own liberty while benefitting from the advantages of a collective organization, declared that he would freely give up all his rights to the general will, provided that he himself had his legitimate share in the formation of the general will. Hence, he sanctioned in advance the investiture which would be given by the general will to all regularly constituted public authority. In like manner he approved in advance every legislative measure which the public will from that time forward would adopt, his own particular will henceforth being only the permanent execution of the public will.

The law of numbers and the right of majority thus take on a moral character, because they would have for their base a contract legitimately closed, and because they would tend to impose upon the individual only what he himself had freely and previously accepted.

This theory being rather paradoxical, it will be well, before discussing it, to give here the fundamental tenets which formulate it by quoting some of the best known passages of Rousseau's *Contrat Social*.

This is the end to be attained:

To find that form of association which shall protect and defend, with the whole force of the community, the person and the property of each individual; and in which each person, by uniting himself to the rest, shall nevertheless be obedient only to himself, and remain as fully at liberty as before.<sup>1</sup>

The clauses of the contract

... are all reducible to one, namely, the total alienation of every individual, with all his rights and privileges, to the whole community. For, in the first place, as every one gives himself up entirely and without reserve, all are in the same circumstances, so that no one can be interested in making his common connection burdensome to others.<sup>2</sup>

The formula of the pact would be:

We, the contracting parties, do jointly and severally submit our persons and abilities to the supreme direction of the general will of all, and in a collective body, receive each member into the body as an indivisible part of the whole.<sup>3</sup>

To the end, therefore, that the social contract should not prove an empty form, it tacitly includes this engagement, which alone can enforce the rest, namely, that whoever refuses to pay obedience to the public will shall be liable to be compelled to it by the force of the whole body. And this is in effect nothing more than that they may be compelled to be free; for such is the condition which, uniting every citizen to the state, frees him from all personal dependence—a condition which forms the whole edifice and play of the political machine. It is this alone that renders all social engagements just and equitable, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.<sup>4</sup>

By entering into the social contract, man gives up his natural liberty or unlimited right to everything which he is desirous of and can attain. In return for this, he gains social liberty, and the exclusive ownership of all those things which he possesses.<sup>5</sup>

Outside of the primitive pact, which was necessarily unanimous:

The determination of the majority is always obligatory on the rest: this is a necessary consequence of the contract itself. . . . The constant will of all the members of state, is the general will; and it is this alone that makes them either citizens or freemen. . . . When a law is passed contrary to my opinion, it proves nothing more than that I was mistaken, and that I concluded the general will to be what it really was not. So that, if my particular advice had been followed, it would have been contrary to my will, which, since I am a citizen, is the same as the general, and in that case I should not have been free.<sup>6</sup>

We will not reproach Rousseau with a lack of clarity or logic, or with not having the courage of his conviction. But his observations should be based upon the truth of his doctrine of political power. This doctrine and its stupendous and overwhelming conclusions depend upon a gratuitous and fallacious hypothesis. The heavier practical consequences of the social pact become for those who must bear them, the more is it indispensable that the existence and the terms of such an agreement be certain, verifiable, and placed beyond the pale of all honest and serious dispute. In fact there is question here of a total alienation of natural rights, and of the substitution of onerous and fastidious safeguards—those safeguards which arise from the general will of the contracting parties—the liberty bestowed by nature.

Now, the very existence of the social contract is absolutely gratuitous fiction, a product of the imagination of Rousseau, and of the mystical and literary tradition which is at the origin of his theory. The social contract does not possess nor pretend to possess even the slightest authentication in the world of facts, either in historical times or in the prehistoric ages of peoples. If answered to a moral and social demand which Rousseau held for a necessity of nature and of life, we could just say that such an invention is justifiable as the image or symbol of something real which could not help so expressing itself in one form or another. But according to Rousseau's theory, the formation of the body politic does not answer to any necessary demand of our social nature, it is a fortuitous and optional occurrence resulting from



and deliberate choice of our rational will. The clauses of the agreement would be precisely the articles of that optional, reciprocal, and burdensome contract which we have easily embraced. Nevertheless, the reality of the contract vanishes as soon as we inquire into its objective existence, whether in historic or prehistoric ages. It is a fiction of literature and imagination. Hence, it must be admitted that the whole theory which rests upon this contract, the whole series of social consequences which Rousseau pretends to deduce from its terms vanish as fantasies without persistence, without objective reality, without the least serious value.

Not upon such a foundation are we able either to establish a social order or to justify obligations as rigorous as those which Rousseau's theory would, in the very name of the original contract, impose upon all the members of the body politic.

This is especially so since the clauses of the so-called contract seem to cry out against all moral and psychological probability. The alienation of personal rights to the benefit of the whole body is so complete that it supposes in each of the contracting parties a self-abnegation greater than that which obtains even in the profession of solemn vows in a religious institute, or for that matter, in the monastic profession of the evangelical counsels. The act of faith which each of the contracting parties is supposed to make in the supreme virtue of the general will by ratifying in advance all the decisions which it eventually will make is a phenomenon of a quasi-mystical order, which, in the system of the philosophy of law and political institutions, we are unable to postulate seriously as the foundation of the universality of the obligations of social life. Finally, it exceeds the limits of all moral probability and philosophical reality, when, for the purpose of establishing and legalizing the right of the majority, we attribute to each of the contracting parties that acme of renunciation which would consist in preferring the triumph of the general will to the accomplishment of their own, when their own personal opinion differs from the opinion of the majority. However ingenious and audacious Rousseau's paradox may be, pointing out to some individual of the minority that he has every reason to be enchanted with his lot because he is being forced to be free, every sane and intelligent mind will realize that such a doctrine comes close to mystification, that it abuses the general naïveté in which the ideology of the eighteenth century moved, and, in plain English, is only a mockery of the people.

Briefly, the theory developed by Rousseau in *Contrat social* aims at giving a moral and doctrinal foundation to the juridical obligations of political society. But it does not succeed in doing so at all. It is based upon a gratuitous and fantastic hypothesis; it heaps up moral and psychological improbabilities; it justifies in advance any tyranny of the public will by sophisms which defy a sane, proportionate appreciation of what should be according to the reasonable demands, be it of the temporal good in

political society, or of the rôle of authority, or of the rôle of liberty. For a punishment, the doctrine of *Contrat Social* would have had to offer some semblance of an ideological justification of the monstrosities committed by the Jacobin and Revolutionary governments of France, which pretended to act in the name of the general will in confiscating the property, the rights, and the liberty of others, and even in cutting off the heads of a refractory minority to force them to learn how to be free.

### III

To speak truly, the principal criticism merited by Rousseau's system can direct us to an objective and rational solution of the problem of the origin of political power. Rousseau's chief error lies in this: in his idolatry of liberty—even when justifying the grossest servitude—he considered the organization of men into the body politic as something optional. A reciprocal agreement, then, whose clauses are freely consented to, would have directed the original constitution of society. Such, we know, is the fundamental invention upon which all the other sophisms of Rousseau and the French Revolution were grafted.

But it is just at this point that an objective analysis of facts demands another explanation. The permanent union of individuals and of families in political society is not the result of a simple and free choice of the human will. It is postulated by certain needs, certain reasonable demands of human nature itself. From the time that men have multiplied and lived in close relations with each other in the same more or less restricted territory, a host of needs, physical, intellectual, and moral, have sprung up—needs that could not find any real satisfaction, any serious guarantee or any efficacious safeguard except in a much vaster organization whose very *raison d'être* was to procure the advantages corresponding to the social nature of man. This is no luxury, not even a legitimate one. It is a moral necessity, a reasonable demand of nature itself and of the condition of mankind. Civic and political society is not a social framework which men have only to choose optionally and freely; it is one which responds to the original law of their condition, to the normal postulate of their destiny. To submit, therefore, to whatever the organization and the life of civic and political society legitimately and reasonably require, is to obey the order and the law of human nature in the same sense that it is obeying the law of man's nature to put in practice the essential duties of family life, and to respect the property and the rights of others.

Let us proceed a step further. To profess that civil and political society is postulated and demanded by the nature of man and by the nature of things, by virtue of their legitimate and reasonable requirements, is to profess at the same time that this civic and political society corresponds to the positive will and to the clear and certain intention of the Author and Creator of nature. This is a truth of rational philosophy which finds its consecration and its sanction in a higher order, in the revealed teaching of Christianity. The organization of men into civic and



political society corresponds to the very ordination of God, manifested by the reasonable need of nature.

Here, then, is the solid and objective foundation of civil and political obligations according to natural law, and according to Christian law. But the very reason which demonstrates that political society is demanded both by nature and by the Creator of nature also demonstrates, with the same evidence, that the public authority of political society is equally demanded by nature and by its Creator. This is a second truth of natural and of Christian law which is inseparable from the first. Indeed, nothing can be clearer after an objective examination into the nature of man and of things. There is no human society, whatever its character may be, that can accomplish its task if it has not at its head a permanent power, a stable authority which governs it, represses abuses, and effectually directs it in the pursuit of the ends for which it has been instituted. Such is the case, above all, in the civic and political society by reason of the gravity of its mission, and of the complexity of its object. There is no society without authority; no social organization without social power. To insist upon such evidence would be breaking down a door that is already open.

Since human nature and the order of the Creator demand a political society, they likewise require a social authority at the head of the city and a political power at the head of society. Such is the rational and objective foundation of the principle of the authority of the State. Such is the Christian and rational answer to the problem of the origin of political power.

We designedly keep our response in the realm of generalities, for our task here is to establish a philosophical doctrine of an essential, fundamental character, and of universal import. As a consequence, this is not the place to enter into the famous controversy about the transmission of divine investiture to the representatives of the political power. This investiture, according to some, is transmitted by God to the whole social body, and the rulers of the State, in their turn, have it only in virtue of a formal or tacit delegation of the social body. Hence their investiture would be *mediately* divine. Other philosophers and theologians hold that the investiture devolves directly from God to the rulers of the State themselves, while they exercise the power according to conditions conformable to the requirements of the common good. Their investiture would then be *immediately* divine. In reality, the controversy is purely speculative without any connection with practical affairs, and even in the realm of philosophical concepts is only of accessory importance. We leave it, therefore, to the discussion of the schools.

But what is of supreme importance is the philosophical and theological doctrine of the *divine* origin of political power, whether it comes to the rulers of the State *mediately* or *immediately*. In either event, the public authority in the State comes to those in whom it is invested as a result of natural conditions and the historical circumstances of mankind. These are the conditions and the circumstances

which peacefully and equitably answer the requisites of the social order and the public good of every country. In such circumstances, the power should be regarded as the authentic and legitimate representative of the authority which comes from God. To obey it is to obey the divine ordinance. To resist it, when it acts within its normal sphere, is to resist the divine power and will. To respect the power of the representative of God, even in temporal affairs is not a mere practical necessity resulting from force and compulsion. It is a moral duty, obligatory and binding in conscience.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, the doctrine of the divine origin of political power will in nowise be a blind sanction of the caprices of those who exercise the public authority. The same rational and objective norm, which establishes the sacred character of power, measures the precise extent of its sway and the just limit of its right to command. It would be in connection with the nature of the limits of human law that this principle would naturally be developed. The main idea is that political power, to protect the legitimate liberties whose safety is confided to it, takes its right to command from the reasonable exigencies of the public interest in view of the common temporal good. Therefore, when the directors of political power would be guilty of an attempt, which is evidently criminal, against the rights, interests, and liberties of which they are the guardians, or against the superior and sacred rights which transcend the jurisdiction of the State and belong to a higher order, the same cause which establishes the principle of authority in the State would establish, in such a case, a moral right, and sometimes even a moral obligation, to disobey a measure manifestly abusive, and to resist an unjust intrusion of the State in affairs outside its own domain. To exclude tyranny from a power that has strayed from its purpose is just as necessary as to sanction the legitimate authority of a power that is faithful to its noble mission.

The rational doctrine of the divine origin of political power—a doctrine sanctioned by Christian revelation—escapes the errors and weaknesses, the pitfalls and the excesses of each of those theories which, regardless of the dress they wear, either debase or divinize public authority by leading to anarchy or to tyranny. In conformance with the laws of a supreme and divine Wisdom, the rational and Christian doctrine of the origin of political power conciliates, in a just and harmonious synthesis, *res olim inso-ciabiles, principatum et libertatem*, those two things long considered as incompatible, the sacred right of legitimate political sovereignty and the loyal respect of necessary liberties.

#### REFERENCES

- <sup>1</sup> Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *Contrat Social*, Garnier Frères, Paris, Bk. I, chap. 6.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. 7.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. 8.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, chap. 2.
- <sup>7</sup> Romans 13:1-7.



# The Political Structure of Communism

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THE plan of this symposium on the Philosophy of the State considers the State as it is at present evolved under the influence of centuries of Christianity. My task is to describe an alternative to the (more or less) Christian State, an alternative which has been urged with increasing persistence for over a century under the name of Socialism or Communism. I have to inquire whether the theory is capable of being realized in practice in such a way as to fulfill satisfactorily the proper functions of a State—those, namely, which man in community may reasonably look for—and if not, why not. Happily the discussion need not be altogether abstract, for it is our fortune today to see an attempt to apply the Communistic Theory, vigorously and on a stupendous scale, in the endeavor to rule Soviet Russia by its principles. Before the Russian experiment, which has now been unremittingly pressed forward for over seventeen years, the discussion might not have been conclusive; now that it is being tried, in a field exceptionally favorable for the test, we can illustrate our discussion by its results.

Communism as a political theory is based on the equality of man, not indeed in the Christian sense which emphasizes the common origin and destiny of each individual, but in a sense purely material, which denies creation and future life, and therefore sees no reason in the nature of things why one man should serve or dominate another. However, since the theory has been introduced into a world which is already hierarchical and in which the vast majority of mankind is in a subordinate position, it has taken, by way of reaction, the shape of a movement for the dictatorship of the proletariat—a complete reversal of the present state of things. One must assume that this is merely a transitional stage and when the revolution is accomplished, there will be neither bourgeoisie nor proletariat; all citizens will be equal before the law. Until this is accomplished, there will inevitably be large classes which are practically outlawed; as we see to be the case in Russia today.

However, as this Utopia admittedly belongs to the remote future, its details have nowhere been exhaustively formulated. All that we can learn from the most authoritative handbook *The A. B. C. of Communism* (p. 29) is that, in the State to come, all the necessities and amenities of life will be produced in abundance by willing workers trained to turn their hands to everything. "To each according to need; from each according to capacity." In the transition, however, Communism, as distinguished from anarchy, has to recognize authority and law as part of the necessary framework of organized Society, which must consist of rulers and the ruled. Thus, to start with, the complete equality of all men has to be discarded; there can be no State which is not hierarchical in authority

and function. Moreover, apart from this necessary division of rulers and ruled, those who govern must be few and competent, distinguished from the rest by their capacity to rule. This inevitably follows from the fact that there are, in spite of their common status as creatures, many inequalities amongst men, whether intellectual, moral, or physical, which cannot be ignored. Communism, therefore, to be consistent would have somehow to provide that all citizens have a real share in the government, whilst, at the same time, preventing the consequent formation of divergent parties. Experience has shown that there is only one way in which this latter result, in matters political, can be secured, namely, by the *de facto* government setting itself above the law and suppressing in its citizens all right to criticize, object, and resist. In other words, before Communism can even be started, it has to try to reconcile two contradictory principles—liberty and despotism. Now, to enforce, as necessarily perfect or even as good, a particular political ideology on intellectual beings, capable of seeing its defects, is wholly destructive of that liberty of self-expression which the theory of Communism claims to vindicate. There is only one system of truth, to which the human mind can reasonably be forced to assent, namely, that revealed on God's authority; and even in that case the enforcement is not physically immediate—"He that believeth not, *shall* be condemned." It is a sanction revealed and accepted by faith. Accordingly, Communism, in transition, is necessarily despotic, and, since all authority comes from God whom it denies, it has no just sanction behind its authority.

For it is precisely because Communism denies God and His rights, and considers religion a mere superstition, that it can recognize no higher authority than the State, the temporal welfare of which becomes automatically the object of all laws and the standard of all morality. If murder and robbery are regarded as wrong, it is only because their prevalence would injure the community. Were there any occasion when such actions might seem to profit the State, that alone would justify them. Moreover, since the theory assumes State ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, controlling the industrial as well as the political life of the citizens, the Communist State stands revealed as in every sense totalitarian, omnipotent and omniscient, and presents, in its most perfect form, an outstanding phenomenon of the post-war world, fraught with the deadliest dangers to liberty and Christian civilization. Even if its Utopian ideal—freedom, competence, happiness for all—were attainable, the process of reaching it is essentially evil, involving a repudiation and denial of inalienable human rights. For, on the hypothesis that man is self-created, the individual is autonomous, and to interfere with his liberty without



his consent is unjust. Although for his own better development he parts with some of his freedom to secure the advantages of social existence, he cannot part with the whole of it without becoming a slave and losing his human dignity. It is this claim to subordinate to a merely external human end the whole personality of its citizens that brands the Absolute State as an inhuman despotism. Nor is there any possibility of Communism, as we see it at present, shedding its obnoxious qualities. It is more thoroughly opposed to its own ideal—freedom from all sorts of oppression, moral, economic, political—than it is to the bourgeois civilization which it is endeavoring to replace. And there is no reason why it should ever relax its iron discipline, since to allow criticism, to tolerate any opposition to its plans, would begin the process of its own destruction. Utopia is not in the right line of evolution from what is literally a soul-destroying tyranny.

Accordingly, because of its own materialistic assumptions the Communist State must forever be unrealizable in practice, for it contradicts the basic facts of human nature. It ignores not only the soul but the intellect of man. Pathetically dazzled by their false ideal, sincere Communists tell us that the ruthless suppression of the individual which we see in Russia and elsewhere is regrettably necessary, in order to do away with the old system, which, with its vision of a blissful kingdom of heaven, prevented even the desire of a perfect State on earth, and which by its encouragement or toleration of innumerable forms of self-aggrandisement, made life so wretched for the weak and indigent masses. The process of eradicating the widespread and inveterate tradition of all past time from the minds of those grown old in it, must needs be stern and painful. And, therefore, although in no substantial particular has the lot of the worker been as yet made lighter and, although the lot of innumerable others whom the State is bound to protect has been made immeasurably worse, the process must go on. Confronted by the failure of the French Revolution, a movement, like theirs, of reaction against the oppression of the poor and inspired by similar humanitarian ideals, they say that the earlier Terror failed because it was not properly organized, did not go deep enough, and was not inspired by a consistent philosophy. There was too much real "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality" about it. There must be no weakness of this kind about this later attempt.

It must be said that the Absolute State in Russia, that is, the few able and determined men who, with all due observance of legal form, have seized power there, have gone about their work with the utmost thoroughness. First of all they have begun by attempting to eliminate belief in God from the minds of their subjects. For the first time in history, as the Pope reminds us, the forces of atheism have been organized corporatively and scientifically. The Communist State has taken all education for its province. Although by law conscience has been declared free, in practice no religion may be taught except the denial of religion. The fact is too notorious to need elaboration,

yet its saddest aspect is that it has excited so little reprobation amongst the so-called Christian nations, which are more concerned with the economic heresies practised in Russia than with conduct which sweeps away the basis of all morality. In Soviet Russia the child *belongs* to the State. As yet the dreadful experiment has not gone very far, and no one can tell to what extent the attempt to produce a nation of atheists will succeed. The second step in the disintegration of the family is the legalization of "divorce for the asking," of abortion, and, of course, of contraception. Thus, as far as legislation can do it, family life, the foundation of all stable society of men, has been abolished under Communism.

It goes without saying that since the institution of private property has also been suppressed, one of the chief motives for the maintenance of a family has been removed. But the human nature against which the Communists are warring has, in this instance, proved too strong for the tyrants, and various modifications of the laws against ownership have been from time to time introduced. The Soviets have shown themselves not altogether impervious to the teachings of experience, and it may be even that the innate religious spirit of the Russian masses will compel after a time a recognition of their right to believe in and worship God.

The spectacle of what man is capable of when he has really lost his belief in the supernatural and the future life presented to us by the condition of Russia today, should move us not to mere denunciation but also to a recognition of the cause of that disastrous unbelief. The cause may be readily reduced to the neglect of Christians to practise Christianity and to their allowing covetousness—the desire for merely material prosperity—to become the leading motive of their lives, whether individually or socially. More briefly, the evils of Communism are a reaction against the evils of Capitalism. It has long been recognized by Christian thinkers that much of the inspiration of Communism is due, in reality, to a genuine but misdirected "love of the brotherhood." If I may say so reverently, Communists, like the Divine Master of us all, "have compassion on the multitude." At any rate, it is because Christians have allowed, without effective protest, so much injustice to go on under legal and constitutional forms, that they have given a real point of appeal to Communist agitators, enabling them to pose as the saviors of those pastorless multitudes who have lost their trust in Christianity.

I have said nothing of the particular form in which the State in Russia is exercising its control over industry in its strenuous endeavor to turn a nation of 160 million peasants into mechanized industrialists, for the experiment is still in its earlier stages, and one cannot really predict its issue. It is not the only illustration of the lapse into paganism involved in the Communist State, when the machine becomes master and man the slave. Man cannot but worship, whether the true God his Maker who is also redeemer and sanctifier, or gods of his own creation who are devils in disguise.



## EDITORIAL—Ultimates

IT IS an obvious fact to thinking men of today that our time is a time of transition and change. There is on the one hand, an ever increasing rejection of what was dear to our forefathers most ancient and cherished heritages; while, on the other, we are stretching out for a new order of things in economics, politics, and religion. The Modern Age, as a consequence, is replete with all kinds of paradoxes. Each system of thought and each program of reform refers to itself as the universal panacea; but we can pick flaws in all of them. This constant rise and fall of our sanguine hope for a solution, this constant buffeting at the hands of Progress, the tyrant of our day, has led not a few of our intellectual leaders to cynicism. Every phase of our civilization and culture is so topsy-turvy that to attempt a proper rearrangement of the hierarchy in nature seems to be sheer folly.

But there is another view of things which is quite different. Our age is favored and blessed in this, that we are being forced to go back to essentials and sound fundamentals. Man's implicit trust in the materialistic optimism of the past century has waned; and upon inquiry that system (if one may ever render it that commendation) has been found wanting. Man is more than a mere automaton; he is more than a clockwork machine wound up by meat and drink. Consequently, this wholly superficial way of thinking has been definitely set aside, and we are face to face again with the long-forgotten and despised questions of the Medievalists. We are back again to the questions: What is man? where did he come from? why is he here? and what will be his end? One example of this return to ultimates is the increasing importance of the psychological problems, and the intensive research that is being carried on in this field of science. Modern psychologists are at last reverting to the real object of their profession, namely, the study of man as man. According to Doctor Allers, the most eager search today is for an Anthropology."

Now, this insistent search for first principles is perhaps the characteristic feature of the renaissance in metaphysics which is gaining such an astonishing hold in the world of thought today. Indeed, as Doctor Allers says in another place, the insecurity of life, the uncertainty of knowledge, and the menacing changes in society have forced us to ask ultimates and fundamental concepts. And it is indispensable that we do this. For, how can a system of philosophy which professes to meet modern problems be adequate and true if in its first principles it fails to take cognizance of man's nature in its totality? Modern science, indeed, has told us what we can know, what we shall do, and how we shall do it, but it has failed utterly in telling us what we are. False notions of research and method have led scores of learned men to spend their lives on mere facts, the periphery of the total self.

The point we should like to make here is, we believe, readily deduced from the papers treating Communism and Nationalism in this symposium. From what is said there it is clear that these two systems of political philosophy are based on false assumptions. They fall short in the basic and all-important concept of man as man with the result that they must twist man's nature (if that is ever possible) to fit their theories. Each is a system, logical enough perhaps, but warped from the very start. Each leads to extremism which, in the words of Father LaFarge, "is disruptive because it destroys the delicate balance demanded by the intricate hierarchy of human institutions."

Now the Neo-Scholastic philosophers of our day maintain that they possess these fundamental and true concepts of man and the State, of social justice and solid progress. They find them in the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas and in the accumulative thought of succeeding generations. In setting forth this claim we must always keep in mind this distinction. No Neo-Scholastic harbors the desire that we return to the Middle Ages in regard to the material conveniences of our age. He is the first to confess that ours is a superior civilization in countless ways. Indeed, he is no more in favor of scrapping our scientific contributions than Macaulay was diffident in his praise of them. But he does want to return to the ultimate truths of the Medievalists; he does want to rehabilitate their fundamental concepts of man and State, and their place in the God-made hierarchy of being. Man's religious, social, and political environments have changed from that of the Medievalists, but man himself in *quantum est homo* has not. In an ultimate analysis he is one and the same man as the Medievalist; he has the same passion for freedom, the same quest of beauty and truth, the same possibilities of love and hate.

This is the Neo-Scholastics' plea and rightly so. For whatever program of reform man may devise, if it will be successful, it must go back to ultimate concepts. It must first decide what man is before it can frame for him a new order of life. Man as man is the indivisible atom upon which every political philosophy must build. It must have recourse to *metaphysical thinking* which, in the words of Peter Wust in the *Colosseum* for June, 1934, "aims at the ultimate meaning of existence."

The Modern Age, therefore, has come to a crossroad in the march of mankind toward its final and appointed end—a crossroad which is no less important for us and for those who will come after us than was the Revolution for America. We are dealing with basic and ultimate principles, and Aquinas' timely warning is not out of place: *Parvus error in initio, magnus est in fine*. Scholasticism has these principles and can substantiate the soundness of its conclusions. It is the task of its followers to make them known today.



# Nationalism and the State

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EFFECTIVE discussion of the relation of nationalism to the State will presuppose agreement as to the meaning of the term nationalism. In its most general application, nationalism is used for a conception of the government of the State which, in some way or other, is superimposed on the pure and simple concept of patriotism. Avoiding any explicit pejorative expression, it is thus defined by Yves de la Brière:

Nationalism is a concept of State government, which gives the primacy to the national interest, among the various aims of political life. This primacy is accorded to the exterior and to the interior power of the State, this power being regarded as the condition required effectively to realize in other ways the common temporal good.<sup>1</sup>

According to Proposition 436 of the Doctrinal Program of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Paris, published in 1930, nationalism becomes a maleficent error "when it considers the primacy of the national interest as supreme and absolute, that is to say as constituting an end in itself to which all other rights without distinction should be sacrificed." It is virtually identical, says the Program, with the resurrection of the pagan theory of the deification of the nation or the State.

The power of the State, or the national interest as expressed by that power, is the proper object of nationalism. Excessive devotion to that power, by which it is granted an absolute place in the total scheme of human rights, is nationalism as just described.

Of Professor Charles A. Beard, Secretary Wallace remarks: "His supreme interest is the national interest. He writes with more intelligent patriotism than any other American I have read."<sup>2</sup> "Nationalism" might here be applied in the merely general, not objectionable meaning. However, the word is currently used in this latter sense.

As Father de la Brière points out, there is as yet no authoritative identification of "nationalism" with an erroneous excess of devotion to the national interest. *Nationalismus* has not been condemned as have *socialismus* and *communismus*. In his Encyclical *Ubi Arcano* of 1922, Pope Pius XI uses the terms: *immoderatum nationis amorem*, and in the Encyclical *Caritate Christi*, 1932, he reproves those who exaggerate the sentiment of piety, otherwise legitimate, which they owe to their own nation:

*Legitimo in patriam studio abutens, debitaque erga suam nationem pietatis sensus plus aequo extollens, quam quidem pietatem rectus christianae caritatis ordo, nedum improbet, at suis normis sanctam vivacioremque efficit. . . .*

(Abusing the legitimate devotion to country and exaggerating beyond justice the sentiment of nationalism, a sentiment which the right order of Christian charity does not indeed disapprove of but, on the contrary, which it safeguards, sanctifies and enlivens. . . .)

The abuses referred to in these words of the Holy Father are assumed, however, to be what is commonly meant by

"nationalism," and are distinguished, according to his language, from a "legitimate devotion to one's country."

## I

The fact of (excessive) nationalism needs no demonstration; indeed it is painfully evident. From a psychological point of view it is thus described by the French publicist, Fortunat Strowski:

Nationalism is an idea which acts as a center and ferment for national life. Not a mere formula, not at all; but a concept which for some is vague, for others precise; which, gradually enters the sentiments, impregnates action, and develops into instinct, sometimes into passion. If this passion secures enough consistency and interior energy to draw to itself, by a progress which will increase with the number of its adherents, the active sentimental forces of the country it replaces patriotism.

A principal psychological factor in the nationalistic sentiment is man's natural tendency to look down upon those of other national groups, races, or social customs. This tendency is greatly heightened by other accompanying factors, such as the enthusiasm accorded by other members of one's own group to such a depreciatory attitude, and the rivalry caused by economic competition with those of other nations. When this rivalry becomes a matter of struggle for national existence, as in post-War Germany as a result of the Versailles Treaty, tendency passes into the deeper chord of human instinct, and the flame of nationalism is fed.

That the psychological phenomenon of nationalism has obtained such rapid growth in our times is due to various historical factors. In *Thought*, for September, 1934, the present writer summed up three of these as divorce from the land, with its accompaniment of urbanization and industrialization; the perversion of civilization; and the decay of religion. Through the first-mentioned state of things the proper balance between local and national cultures has been destroyed, and the door left open to territorial agitation, as is seen in the interminable perplexities of the European minorities. The instruments of civilization—discoveries in physical or political science—which of their nature should promote tranquillity and mutual understanding between nations, are wrested to propaganda, serve to heighten economic rivalries through facilitating exploitation, and to exalt the centralizing power of the State. With the decay of religion, resistance is destroyed to theories such as Hegelianism and Marxianism, which translate the State's pragmatic action into terms of philosophic doctrine.

## II

From the ethical side, nationalism sins against justice and charity both at home and abroad. Were we living in an imaginary world, where each nation could pursue



its own end without reference to the rights and duties of other national groups, there could be no injustice in each nation cultivating its own national interests to whatever degree of absolutism it might desire. Medieval Burgundy or Castile, for instance, could hardly offend medieval China by any degree of nationalistic exaltation, however much that might harm their immediate neighbors. The fact, however, that the modern nations form part of an international community produces a conflict of interests through their interdependence for the material goods of life. Hence no nation today, particularly any nation which is large and powerful, can cultivate an unlimited devotion to its national interests without thereby violating that mutual regard of correlative rights and duties between national groups which membership in the international community entails.

The seriousness of this threat against justice was aptly expressed by Wallace McClure, of the United States Department of State, speaking before the American Political Science Association in Chicago, December 28, 1934:

As civilization proceeds apace, as mechanical invention increases the desire of the people for the produce of distant lands, and as desire crystallizes into the assertion of rights, nationalism, if it is not itself moderated, becomes an increasing peril, threatening the progress if not the very life of the human race. With the multiplication of the function and power of national governments, these governments, unless they are intelligently democratic, that is unless they represent understandingly the higher aspirations and the real welfare of the masses of the people, find their opportunities increased to lead nations to mutual destruction.

Students of the international scene note the paradoxical increase in national interdependence coupled with the decrease in the sense of mutual responsibility, a decrease fostered by nationalism. This phenomenon is in considerable measure attributable to the disappearance from the modern consciousness of that fellowship of all classes, races, and nations in the scheme of Christian redemption which was formerly present to all parts of Christendom as such. The decay of religion, while allowing free play to the disease, has removed the remedy for the disease.

### III

The injustice of nationalism, however, is not confined to international relations. Exaltation of the power of the State, as the expression of the national interest, leads to the neglect of other components of the national interest which cannot be expressed in terms of power, hence to injustice. "The absolute State is utterly foreign to Thomism, and indeed to Christian teaching. A relative limit is set by the organic nature of the State, which St. Thomas follows Aristotle in teaching."<sup>3</sup> The maxim of St. Thomas: *justitia est maxime salvativa civitatis* applies to nationalism as it affects the highest interests of the State. Where rational or moderate devotion to the interests of the State gives way to excessive nationalism, the highest inter-

est of the national community, which is the spiritual welfare of its own members, is certain to suffer. The blow to spiritual welfare, however, sooner or later translates itself into social disorder, and this in time to economic distress, by which nationalism defeats its own most evident and proximate end.

This contradiction between excessive nationalism and the spiritual interests of the nation is demonstrated by the conflict that arises between nationalism and religion. Where the national power is mystically deified, as in the Soviet Communist State, there is no room for anything but a relentless opposition to religion in any shape and form. Bated emphasis, under the Stalin régime, upon the national loyalty, offers no ground for inferring any moderation in antagonism to religion. This antagonism is identified with the concept of the absolute State, which concept, in the Bolshevik ideology, is not modified by any shift of emphasis from the international to the national. Such unqualified opposition, likewise, is the natural consequence of the identification through seizure of military and economic power, of the national interests with the unbridled personal interests of individuals, as in contemporary Mexico.

In other nationalistically minded countries, the recognition given to religion is correlative with the degree that religion's free development is recognized—popularly or governmentally—as essential for the highest interests of the nation. The gamut is run from the threats of the extremist elements in Nazi Germany to the latent uneasiness which certain types of American patriots feel over the universality and spiritual independence of the Catholic Church. All the more dangerous from its insidiousness, is the hyper-nationalistic attitude which would pay homage to religion as the palladium of private and civic virtues, but would seek to convert religion into a subservient instrument of the State. Outstanding example of that philosophy is the Action Française movement in France, voiced by its leaders, Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet. Acrimonious controversies concerning the rights of the Holy See to which the Action Française and its condemnation gave birth caused most people to lose sight of the fact that absorption of spiritual freedom by nationalistic policy, as exemplified in this movement, involves a destruction of domestic human rights as well. The cynical contempt shown by Maurras and his followers for elementary human rights betrays the ethical unsoundness of their form of nationalism.

### IV

Mr. McClure's expression, "Nationalism, if it is not itself moderated," assumes that there can be a moderate—presumably an equitable—form of nationalism; as there is a just patriotism. Patriotism has been defined as that piety which we owe to the country of our birth (*patria* or *Vaterland*) or adoption. *Legitimum in patriam studium—debitae erga suam nationem pietatis sensus* (Pius XI). This piety prompts us to perform our duties as citizens of



that land; to refrain from those acts which are injurious to it; and to make such sacrifices of property or person, nay of life itself, as are necessary to preserve its integrity. This integrity, however, cannot be preserved, under present conditions, without the power of the State. Under normal circumstances no particular devotion is needed to maintain this power. Its need is obvious, and its machinery takes care of itself. But in times of crisis or national emergency a special zeal may be needed to maintain the State's power—military or economic. Such zeal or devotion would exceed the object of patriotism, and constitute a special virtue, which may be termed legitimate nationalism. Within these bounds, therefore, nationalism—in this moderate sense—would have its place. "In short," says de la Brière, "nationalism will present itself as a particular form of vigilance and an armature of patriotism."

So powerful, however, are the military and legal instrumentalities possessed by the modern State for executing the behests of the nationalistic sentiment; so effective are the agencies by which the sentiment may be cultivated, that a major question of the times is how to keep devotion to the national interests within bounds and prevent its assuming unlimited control of all functions of society. The sole satisfactory answer to this question is found in the restraint exercised by religion. But wherein does this restraint consist?

The Protestant historical tradition pictures that institution of religion which alone consistently and universally opposes excessive nationalistic sentiment: the Catholic Church, as acting from a spirit of rivalry. The Church is accused of vindicating its power out of jealousy for the power of the State. Reprobation of excessive nationalism is thus merely a phase in the resistance of religious vested interests to the growing interests of democratic secularism.

Such a view, apart from its historical unreality, is false to the true function of religion and of the Church. Religion alone is able to establish an all-embracing order in the many functions which make up the national society. It can do this because it refers all these functions to a supreme, supernatural end. Without such a supreme end it is impossible to establish a functional order. Society cannot be its own end. The Positivist attempt to perform this service for society resulted in the vicious circle with which nationalism is confronted at the present day.

The increasing complexity of these functions in modern society, while it presents a task for Catholic moralists and theologians, offers no problem to the Catholic Church as such. In view of this supreme end, Catholic political philosophy assigns a scope, in the hierarchy of functions, to each of those socially organizing forces which make up the totality of national life. It accords a generous place to the national idea as an organizing force; and commands, in consequence, a generous devotion to that idea. But it by no means conceives the national interests as the sole agency for social organization. The family interests of the economic group, of the territorial region where his-

toric development sanctions it (such as the individual State in the American Federation), each have their assignable function in the sum total of the interests of the people. The national interests, for instance, cannot in the Catholic scheme of things override the interests of such a major economic group as that of the agricultural population. Hence the drastic opposition between the annihilation of the Ukrainian farmers, as practised in 1932-33 by Stalin, and the constitutional land-reform movements recently inaugurated under Premier Lerroux of Spain.

The Catholic view takes in organizing forces of wider scope than the nation: the organizing forces of the international political community, and of the correlative, the international economic community, which no degree of autarchy can blot out of the picture. Finally, it assigns to all, great and small, their place in a world-wide community, the fellowship of all men actually or potentially, in the spiritual Commonwealth.

In so doing it strengthens the national interest itself, hence validates genuine nationalism. Of itself, nationalism is essentially limited in its scope. No river can rise higher than its source. No matter how ardent the enthusiasm of the convinced nationalist, it does not enable him to plan the lives of each individual citizen. The self-imposed task of nationalistic governments eludes them when they seem nearest to the goal.

Only a freak of modern circumstance places nationalism for the nonce in the rank of the conservative "Right," and the international viewpoint in the rank of the radical "Left." Extreme nationalism, like extreme internationalism, is subversive from its very nature. Extremism, from whatever quarter it comes, is disruptive because it destroys the delicate balance which is demanded by the intricate hierarchy of human institutions.

In social as in individual life-organization, conservation cannot be attained through mechanical and over-simplified means. Military defense, education to patriotism, restraint of immigration, protection of native industries against foreign exploitation, and other such instruments in the national interest have their function within their proper scope. But none of them, nor all of them together, can accomplish the whole task of conserving national integrity, to which nationalism so ardently dedicates itself. Measures moderating and elevating all these activities are needed to correlate them with the interests of humanity as a whole. These measures will take into account humanity's spiritual interests, through the world-wide Mystery of the Redemption. Such a concept will assign a proper place to that special zeal for the power of the State which might be termed a legitimate nationalism. It will insure Christian patriotism. It springs from a sound philosophy of the State. Any other course will result in chaos.

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# The Economic Structure of the State

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THE State itself is an economic being; it functions as a distinct economic agent and maintains, at the same time, important relations with the economic activities of its citizenry as a whole, that is with "national economics." Following Henry Pesch we define "national economics" as the "economics of the people united into a duly organized commonwealth."

In the Patriarchal State and in the Feudal as well, the entire expenses of the government, which were naturally rather limited, were easily defrayed out of returns from definite productive properties of the State. The officials were invested with the tenure of real estate or other goods and holdings sufficient to insure for them an adequate livelihood. Hence, fixed salaries payable out of public funds, as is now the vogue, were scarcely known. And even later, in the states of the period of enlightened absolutism, which were induced by their mercantilistic ideals to undertake far more ambitious tasks and, therefore, to incur proportionately larger expenditures, their revenues from public properties, such as lands, mines, industries, etc., were ordinarily ample enough to balance their budgets. Plain features of this system have survived in some countries even to modern times: for instance, national ownership of the more extensive means of transportation and communication as railroads and postal service, and also the system, so generally in favor today, of municipal ownership of public utilities and services such as water, gas, electricity, etc., the management of which still plays an important rôle in the public economy. For the rest of its funds the modern state relies almost entirely upon taxation, while its investments and enterprises are financed by contracting debts; hence in reality it has become to the most pronounced degree both a tax state and a debtor state.

With evident bias, yet with an appreciable grain of truth, a certain socialistic author has characterized the process of this evolution thus: "Liberalism has 'secularized' not only the goods of the Church but also the property of the State; it has expropriated the State, reduced it to pauperism, turned it over altogether to the whims of its creditors and made it utterly dependent upon tax levies and tax collections. This done, nothing remained of the previous power and wealth of the State but empty treasuries and debts piled high; the gift of the ballot into the hands of the people was, indeed, an inexpensive concession, the gracious privilege by which the 'sovereign people' was

duly empowered to make itself the sole proprietor of the empty treasuries and to assume the full responsibility for the payment of the mountains of debts." Granted again that this analysis is rather caustically partial, it does, nevertheless, touch very deftly one of the sorest spots in the essential constitution of the typically modern form of pure democracy.

Now this much is unquestionable: Today the financial economics of the State and of public corporations is generally sharply marked off from every form of private economics. In its specific elements the economy of the State is not just another particular individual economy functioning on the same plane with the manifold private economic concerns in the commonwealth. Nor are its operations governed by the same principles. The State as such does not raise funds or amass wealth by activities of a directly economic nature, but by the exercise of its supreme power. In virtue of a species of eminent domain it levies taxes upon the private economic concerns operating either within the political union of the nation or in association with some other public corporation, and by this means it "produces" for itself financial funds sufficient to meet the expenditures decreed by the legislative or administrative branches of the government for all the various public purposes serving the general welfare. In practice this system may not be free from regrettable defects, but to outweigh these there stands the fact that its theory enjoys this one outstanding excellence, that it emphasizes in no uncertain way the wide difference between the economics of all private business enterprise and the public economics of the State's finances. It insists, at least in principle, that a sharp line of demarcation should be definitely agreed upon and conscientiously respected as a much needed and effectual precaution against attempts from the side of the State or other public corporations to trespass and prey upon any portion of the domain of private economics.

As for the facts, it is regrettable indeed that in practice the clear border-line has not always been duly respected. Too commonly the tax state has succumbed to the temptation of taking over the charge of wider and ever wider classes and furnishing them with supplies from public funds raised by taxation—a proceeding that marked the degeneration of the welfare state into a relief-supply state. What is worse, it has applied the very revenues extorted from the private economic concerns by exorbitant tax



levies, to the establishment of its own industrial plants which it managed in outright keen competition with those same private economic enterprises—a venture that did not only end in a miscarriage of economy but in the more deplorable loss to the government of its authority and prestige as well as of its self-sufficiency and consequent independence from the economic magnates of the capitalistic régime. As a matter of fact, in the majority of countries, which are capitalistic and also professedly democratic, the entanglement of the two jurisdictions, the governmental and the economic, is ominously near an open clash. Russian Bolshevism, in its own territory, has set itself to put an end to this confusion by a high-handed appropriation on the part of the government of absolutely all economic goods and operations, in order that the State as sole producer, employer, and manager may carry out its ruthlessly compulsory system for the sole benefit of the Soviet State.

In opposition to these theories, this paper is intended to turn upon this vital question of the relations between the State on the one side and economics on the other, in the light of the teaching of the Schoolmen. In other words, it is to treat of the juridical order according to the genuinely Christian and soundly rational interpretation of the law of nature.

If we would understand on factual historical grounds the successive changes that brought the existing confusion of over-lapping jurisdiction between State authority and economic forces into such bitter dispute, we must refer again to Liberalism and its concomitant, Individualism. The distinctly individualistic fashion of thought for which Nominalism was actively blazing a trail all through the period of the decline of Scholasticism from the zenith of its glory, that way of thinking which afterward in the renaissance actually succeeded in breaking through all opposition, had allowed the essentially social character of economics to be ignored and all but forgotten.

Men no longer looked upon the social body of the people as the subject of the economic life of the commonwealth. Nature had herself invested the united people with the right and duty of performing its economic functions, that is, the comprehensive vital process of the socially organized commonwealth. But in this new view, all interest centered in the single individuals as the sole subject and sole object of their individual ambition for gain. Economics itself came to be conceived merely as a sum total of contractual relations freely established between individuals with no consideration beyond their own prospects of greater wealth. The unassailable principle on which these mutual contractual relations, permanent or passing, were based, was that of freedom of exchange of services and remunerations in the open market. The economists of the Classic school developed this conception into a distinct theory according to which neither subject nor object nor even any of the causes (material, formal, efficient, final) are to be admitted into the picture of economy. In economic theory and practice alike nothing is to be taken into consideration except the free exchange of serv-

ices which are to be rated solely from the point of view of utilitarian reasonings and calculations of the unfeeling, cold-hearted *homo oeconomicus*. Now while it is only fair to credit this theory with valuable contributions towards a better exposition of the transactions in the open market under modern capitalistic economic régime, it is no less fair to insist that by misrepresenting the results of its isolating abstraction as realities it has been disloyal to its own boasted method; it has wantonly adulterated the most fundamental concepts of the science of economics in order to square them with its own individualistic, and consequently, atomistic mechanical theory. In short, economics which should be the nation's vital process towards culture was basely degraded into the automatic adjustment of prices.

Long ago, however, before the misguided and misleading theory could be developed to its last practical conclusions "Political Liberalism" had seized upon and exploited the individualistic conception of economics. The upper class of full-fledged citizens, the "circles of wealth and culture," as they were pleased to style themselves in the Germany of the nineteenth century, though they rated their worth rather by the value of their estates than by their cultural attainments—in plain words, the whole ring of entrepreneurs, the higher circles of enterprise and speculation—naturally came to the conscious conviction and feeling that for all their most vital interests they were isolated from the State and quite independent of it. None of their schemes or operations grew out of any idea of service to the commonwealth, but exclusively out of the idea of their own enrichment; moreover, they themselves had introduced the new economic methods of capitalism and they themselves were its only real beneficiaries. For them the State came to stand for the ruling dynasty, the regular army and the government officials.

The bourgeoisie, after creating its social position and economic fortune from its own vital energies, pressed this sole demand upon the State, that the government should steadily maintain conditions of peace and order. Only let peace and security be maintained so that the men of enterprise, the captains of industry and finance, who were wont to call themselves "The Business of the Nation," might carry on to their hearts' content in imperturbable freedom. With national economics thus constituted within the limits of the principles of "Freedom of Ownership and of Contract," with the guarantee of fidelity to contracts enforceable in case of need by the civil power, and with the giant domain of economic energy and life thus immunized against all intermeddling of the State, they felt satisfied that this ideal condition would render the State as superfluous as it was harmless.

In reality, however, they overlooked the fact that the ruling system of unrestrained freedom of ownership and contract, supported by the cold-blooded intervention of the civil power against everyone, who either through malice or sheer inability failed to meet the obligations freely agreed upon, must and did in practice prove to be daringly



trial to the bourgeoisie. This was especially true in regard to the magnates of capital and industry in their big business interests. The most extravagant privilege of the totally one-sided individualistic and capitalistic character of the newly established juridical order between private persons, construed as an individualistic right of nature's own granting, was boldly assumed to be an economic axiom. It was a self-evident principle and, as a consequence, there could be no call for proof of its truth or grounds for a discussion of its merits. No wonder then they were so generous as to waive all claim to other privileges and to content themselves with a single demand upon the State, namely, that they never be disturbed in the complete enjoyment of that one large and general privilege. As a matter of fact this meant nothing less than the high-handed exploitation of a privilege which they never appreciated nor even deigned to acknowledge.

"Indeed the liberal citizenry had good reason to face the future with utter nonchalance and a deepest sense of self-complacent security, now that its reign and rule in its own ideal economic empire was thus fully emancipated from all interference of the government, and assured of the mighty support of the State."<sup>2</sup> Expressions like these from the pen of Gustave Gundlach in his honest effort to describe this economic condition in no way misrepresent the objective facts. For in their day of triumph, the upper classes felt assured that the State had guaranteed them unconditionally the maintenance and vindication of that juridical order with which the individualistic-capitalistic economic régime must stand or fall. In fact, until the latter half of the nineteenth century, and in part even up to the beginning of the World War, the privileged class was in no way shaken in its unlimited confidence.

Gradually, however, the social questionability of the extended rational and natural basis of the new juridical order was made manifest. This awakening came about in the different capitalistic countries at different times. It appeared in England and Germany at a comparatively early period. In the United States, however, whose extensive territory with its vast and rich natural resources could not allow the difficulties to be felt until a much later date, it did not come until very recently. But from the very beginning of this awakening of the people, even while the ruling economic system, always true to its rationalistic-atomistic-mechanistic-individualistic aims and principles was displaying everywhere in its wide domain all its mighty energies without restraint, it was actually creating the "proletariat." This immense mass of people owned no property and, as a consequence, could not share in the boasted freedom of proprietorship. Moreover, they were in no position to make any use whatever of the right of free occupation and contract except to sign a "free" labor agreement, if perchance they were fortunate enough to find an employer and willing enough to stoop to the acceptance of contractual conditions as freely imposed by the prospective employer. In the capitalistic countries of

the Old World the situation had for a long time been aggravated by the fact that the extreme individualism of the new code of rights prohibited under the severest penalties all kinds of coalition or union—a prohibition that never worked much hardship for the financial and industrial lords even in the rare instances where it could not easily be cheated of all its effects by "gentleman agreements" of one kind or another. This situation simply abandoned the defenseless laborer to the arbitrary high-handedness of a wealthy and independent employer. As for the United States, as long as it was the "Land of Unlimited Possibilities," the proletariat consciousness could not well be deepened by labor conditions nor its attitude assume larger proportions by heredity. Therefore, the proletariat problem did not exist to any alarming degree. But now, since the people have been thrown with a real shock upon the outer hard boundaries of the possible, the giant difficulties that England and Germany have had to cope with through several earlier decades have almost of a sudden appeared in full number and weight and in an acutely threatening form.

In the Old World the confidence of bourgeoisie in the dependability of the solemn agreements of the State to lend its full support to the principles of a rationalistic interpretation of natural rights was so complete, that it little dreamed of the real risk it was running in granting the right of suffrage to the proletariat masses. Their right of suffrage was intended to dupe them into the illusion that in virtue of this newly acquired, merely abstract quality of citizenship in the commonwealth they were in reality enjoying an equal right and share in the sovereignty of the pure and unalloyed democracy, while as a matter of course it was clearly understood that both public opinion and the elections themselves would be "made" by the upper strata of culture and wealth.

Indeed this state of affairs was hidden from the very people who proved themselves most loyal to the State; for by reason of their longer military service, whose length they had no means of shortening, they had even jeopardized their lives in actual warfare for their fatherland. It was their service at the front that accentuated in a most compelling manner the identification of the people with the State, and of the fatherland with the government. The newly coined expression, "Germany's poorest son her most loyal son" which was current in Germany after the World War must have had its equivalent in all the countries that had been embroiled in the War. It was precisely the proletariat, without house or homestead to defend, without the smallest parcel of his country's soil, who in the capacity of a private soldier made the greatest sacrifices and proved the most unselfish loyalty by staking his very life for his fatherland. In his honest soul he could not believe that the promises made him were less sincere than his own; and in his unsuspecting credulity he permitted himself to be put off with words as empty of meaning as they were fair in sound.



Now, although the anonymous rings of the moneyed and industrial power acted their busy rôle backstage (this applies not only to the *haute banque* but perhaps in a less degree to the armament and munition industry), they were, nevertheless, able to wield an extraordinary influence in the new purely and perfectly democratic form of government. It soon became evident, however, that in the long run it is the weight of numbers which turns the balance. The proletarian masses coming to the polls forced the social question to the fore-front of the political arena in order to unhinge the juridical order of economics, which till then had been safely liberal-capitalistic. For the realization of their purposes they planned to make use of the legislative apparatus of the State as a long adjustable lever. By way of a beginning, their efforts went towards securing for themselves an active voice in the division of the huge profits derived from large-scale economic operations which under the capitalistic régime were accruing almost exclusively to the stockholders as the proprietary class. Since free competition in the open market failed utterly to bring about anything approaching the desired division, an attempt was made to procure the direct intervention of the civil authority through the enactment and enforcement of drastic market legislations. But bitter disappointments and damaging repercussions soon made the utter futility of such methods abundantly evident. What was needed, therefore, was an entirely new start with a firmer leverage. Accordingly, new efforts were turned to the direct legislative regulations of supply and demand, either by limiting the freedom of competition or even by coercive measures aimed immediately at the proper adjustment of economic production and consumption. Indeed, collective socialism fixed its ideal even higher: Distrustful of the satisfactory efficiency of economic activities according to predetermined plans and of the sufficiency of the restraining and coercive interference of civil authority in the province of economics, it set itself boldly to the radical task of turning over the ownership and management of all the mighty economic forces and instruments to the State itself. Its avowed aim was the nationalization or socialization of all capitalistic enterprise, a plan and system that Soviet Russia has practically developed into unlimited state-capitalism. And according to theory it intends to bring this system to a climax in the universal social freedom of communism. This implies the complete abolition of the State.

Evidently the liberal bourgeoisie was definitely beaten at its own game; the paper ballot with its fictitious sovereignty in the new and absolutely pure democracy had utterly failed to bring the intended consolation and contentment to the proletariat masses who had been robbed of their social standing as well as of all security of economic existence. Instead of a vast multitude of isolated individuals equipped with an abstract quality of citizenship in the State, the capitalistic régime stands face to face with a formidable battle-front of a well-organized proletariat which in a variety of ways has already succeeded

in transforming the political life of many a capitalistic country into vast battle-fields on which the hostile economic classes arrayed as political parties are contending for control in the labor market. In brief, the State and its politics are engaged predominantly with economic problems, while the biggest business of big business is politics. This state of affairs is so ill balanced, that in several countries it has even now issued in a frantic proclamation of the supremacy of politics over economics. At the same time it has favored the inauguration of dictatorships over the whole life of the State.

Prescinding from Soviet Russia which has resorted to an entirely novel settlement—an adjustment, by the way, quite as false and unreasonable as it is definite and clear—all the rest of the world is still confronted by the gigantic problem of bringing order out of the hopeless entanglement of State and economics. Even those countries where political forms of democracy—at its best nothing more than a sham and nominal democracy—has utterly collapsed, now possess at most only a prospective program for the solution of this vital question. Whether their attempts at an adjustment will be carried out, and whether they will really adjust differences, is still questionable.

This paper, it must be understood, does not pretend to offer anything whatever in the way of a new scheme. Its purpose is much more modest, namely, to set forth plainly just a few most fundamental philosophical principles regarding social rights and duties as they are clearly promulgated by natural law and steadfastly defended by Christianity. These sound and solid principles, which are valid everywhere and under all circumstances, demand respectful incorporation in every program.

#### *Nature and Function of the State*

The State is the highest and most comprehensive natural social organization on earth, truly a *societas perfecta*, having for its specific purpose the realization of the common good (*bonum commune*) for all its members and in every way. Hence, there can be no doubt that all the classes and levels of social life have intrinsic and necessary relations with the State. Hence, no domain or portion can ever be so independent that it can be rightly said to be "free" from the State, no association so free that it may defy the State. On the other hand, all circles of social life beginning with the smallest, the family, have the right to live their specific life and to enjoy all the freedom required for the specific purposes of such life. They possess these essential rights not by the grant of the State, but as their very own original rights derived from the Author of nature. In relation to the smaller circles of social life, the larger and higher, and, therefore, most of all the largest and highest natural circle of life on this earth, namely, the State, is subsidiary, even in the strictest sense. The State has no right to invade or impair the proper and independent and personally responsible life of the smaller social organization; indeed, the function and duty of the State is precisely to promote their purposive vitality. Consequently, it now has the right to demand from these units



that peculiar incorporation into the great comprehensive whole which is positively required so that the members may derive from the whole their nature-intended and intrinsic perfection.

### *National Economic*

The economy of a nation is a circle and a process of social life which includes numerous branches and grades. In the atomistic-mechanistic-individualistic conception of national economy, the true nature and essence of economics is woefully misunderstood and misrepresented. True, the natural offspring of this utterly false conception of economics, that is, the individualistic-capitalistic juridical order of economic life, has roused mighty forces into short-lived activity and has effected thereby an unprecedented and intoxicating economic prosperity. For this it deserves credit in so far as it dissolved combinations that were not only failing of their purpose but had already degenerated into positive embarrassments. Yet it merits this praise only (to use the clear terminology of the school) as a *causa per accidens, removens prohibens* (accidental cause which removes impediments to action) and not at all as the genuine *causa per se* (efficient cause). It is clear, therefore, that the economics of the people must needs be organized under an adequate social constitution in order to fill its real purpose which the Creator Himself has plainly pointed out in the natural order instituted by Him. It must make ample provision for worthy human livelihood in such a way as to bring about a lasting harmonization of demand and supply which will insure the ever fuller realization of the God-intended material and spiritual culture of mankind.

### *Economic Structure*

If this social constitution of economics is to accord with its essential purposes, it must be framed and ever rest on the following essential principles:

*Man*, that is, not only those of the higher walks of life, such as the proprietary class, but emphatically *every man*, is at once subject and object and lord of economic activity. Every social constitution of economics, therefore, must start with an honest and full recognition of this rightful place of man as a subject in the economic organization; it must aim to stabilize his position the more solicitously since it is precisely the abnormal development of the liberal-capitalistic era that has robbed an ever increasing number of people of their social and economic place and rights as subjects. As a consequence, there came about the very conditions which gave birth to our present-day "Social Question."

*Man's inherent appetite for gain* is the mightiest driving force of economic life. This appetite may exercise itself in reasonable efforts to earn the necessities of life or in frantic strugglings for larger profits. These twin branches of his craving for worldly goods grow out of his very nature. Both must be taken into account in the public no less than in the private juridical order in the community life of the commonwealth; both must enjoy all the liberty required for their righteous exercise. But on account of

the reasonable legitimacy of the claims of both, neither of the two dare be allowed unlimited freedom of action. Hence, the inescapable conclusion: the State has no right to appropriate to itself (to nationalize or socialize) the whole realm of economics. Therefore, it is not the right of the State either to inaugurate a compulsory economic order totally subjected to its own supreme power, or to direct the systematization and management of economic operations beyond the requirements of objective needs.

A further requirement of man's social nature is the social organization of the nation's economic life in its entirety. The sum total of economic operations is a process of the nation's social life, and to insure it this solid character it is not sufficient that the single isolated individuals engaged in economic activities harbor the interior disposition, however honest and ready, to give all due consideration to the demands of justice and charity toward their individual fellow-men and the welfare of them all united in the commonwealth. No, the sum total of the operators, no less than of their operations, must all cooperate as a living and socially organized system of economics.

The intention of the individualistic State was that it should occupy the entire social arena as a corporation sole. It was to embrace all the citizens of the State individually and directly with this end in view that it would construct and constitute itself the sovereign State out of this mass of millions of citizens as out of so many distinct atoms. This idea is clearly discernible in the proceedings of the State as it was conceived by the French Revolution. In the most arbitrary fashion, the State completely suppressed all corporations that had previously functioned between the State and its individual citizens. Henceforth the State alone remained in the capacity of the one exclusive form of social organization for every sphere of life, which naturally included the realm of economics. And as far as economic life stood in need of some form of organization (and this need soon became strikingly apparent notwithstanding the accepted views of the classic-liberal school of economy) the State had once more to intervene. It was constrained to apply itself more and more actively and directly to economic politics and in the end actually to take over a part of the economic functions and operations themselves. This extreme solution was dictated by the desperate conditions of the times, and, apart from the State, there was simply no one to institute a social form of organization; no one to infuse a unifying principle which was indispensable for the institutional organization of the nation's economics and for the complex process of the social life of the commonwealth. In direct opposition to the classic-liberal school of economy the right order as indicated by nature itself must be the following: In order to perform a definite service such as the supplying of food, clothing, means of transportation and the like, each distinct economic group as it exists in actual life, must bind together all its distinct operators into a duly incorporated social unit. Being thus united they may come to an understanding and agreement, not only upon rules govern-



ing their honorable competition, but most of all upon the fundamental principles and aims of their common efforts to serve their fellow-men in the manifold needs and wants of worthy human existence. They would gain this end by placing within the reasonable reach of all, those indispensable and useful and pleasurable goods together with all the helpful services which their fellow-men rightfully expect from them as a specific economic group. Each distinct economic group is to do this by its own natural right and on its own responsibility, but always within the limits of proper cooperation with all other persons, dependent no less than independent, who are engaged in the same branch of economics. Furthermore, over and above these diverse group-units there might be higher, more comprehensive collective groups designed and empowered to deal definitively with all the wider and larger economic and political tasks and problems which touch the interests not merely of one but of several or of all the numerous economic branches. Problems of this kind, therefore, call for adjustment by the joint action of all the economic group-units concerned.

All services and functions such as the furnishing of proper clothing and of decently human housing facilities, are economic, not political. It stands to reason, therefore, that the direct management and performance of these services to the people of the commonwealth is not the business of the State or government but emphatically the business of the economic enterprises of the people themselves. The solution of this huge task, however, involving so many very complex problems surely will not, like a *deus ex machina*, leap out finished and fully satisfactory to all parties concerned. It cannot be the outcome of any formal and intentional design of the *homines oeconomici* with their passion for self-enrichment, nor by way of a happy by-product of their insatiable greed for wealth; it must be approached and worked out with the deepest conscientiousness and the coolest deliberation. With this in mind we maintain that this extremely complicated task can by no possibility be performed successfully and rightly by any system of individualistically atomized economics, but solely by the nation's economics organized socially.

On the other hand, a righteous solution is simply indispensable for the stable existence of the people, as a people, because the sphere of economics, if duly appreciated, is not at all isolated from the cultural life of the nation, nor is its influence exercised only in secret, as it were, behind its threshold. On the contrary, economics constitutes a very significant part of this cultural life as a decisive co-factor in determining the collective character of the national culture. It dovetails into the home politics of the State and is frequently brought into such intimate contact with the State's foreign policies that it sometimes clashes with the demands of these external policies. This is true everywhere unless correct relations and right order are firmly maintained between the people's economics and the State's government. This right order is the subordination of economics to the supreme political direction of

the State, and since the sphere of the nation's economics touches every weighty problem in the life of the people as a commonwealth, we must come to this further conclusion: Although the social organization develops itself independently, although it functions in its own right and orders and manages its whole domain in virtue of its own native authority to the extent even of creating or constituting rights, still it can never for a moment exist or function independently of its intrinsic relation to the State. It cannot be forgetful of the internal bonds which bind it to the State, of its proper incorporation into the State, or of its due subordination to the State, the most supreme authority founded by nature.

The manner of effecting this social organization of the economic life of a people and the process by which it develops itself into a living part of the State may vary greatly, but the following points are essential:

The economics of a nation constitutes an independent sphere of life, the social organization of which is to grow by its own natural right from below upward, and not from the State downward. Its charter is not derived from the State nor do its rights come to it as a mere grant or delegation of the State.

The social organization of the economic forces is an organization not only of the independent classes, the employers, entrepreneurs, and others, but of all persons engaged in economic pursuits. It is an organization of all who, precisely in virtue of their collective service to the whole people as a commonwealth, are bound together among themselves and accorded a social station within the commonwealth.

This social organization of a nation's economics is essentially related to the people of the State as an organized whole. Accordingly, the nation's government has the natural right to exercise not only a general surveillance, but true supreme direction. It lies within the competency of the State to determine the political aims and purposes, both home and foreign, which the economic life of the nation is to serve, with this proviso, however, that it dare not press its demands beyond the reasonable possibilities of economic effort. The State is entirely within its rights when it resorts to legislative and even coercive action in order to bring and hold the entire economic organization to a proper and adequately vital integration into the totality of the home and foreign policies adopted by the nation. Finally, in its capacity as custodian of the juridical order, the State, it is true, is not authorized to determine what is to be approved as the right thing or correct way for the various departments of economic life, but it has as a sacred right and duty to see to it that the social organization of the nation's economics clearly defines those rights. It is the right and duty of the State to make sure that the order thus fixed really meets the demands of justice, especially of social justice, and to employ energetic measures wherever this order is wantonly invaded, unless forsooth, the social economic organization itself steps in without delay



to apply effective means for the abatement of the disorder.

In full accord with the Encyclical Letter, *Quadragesimo anno*, we are of the firm conviction that by the exact adjustment of the relations between State and economics on these principles, the State will suffer no loss, no weakening in any direction. On the contrary, it can hardly fail to grow stronger and to win back the sovereignty and dignity it has to some extent forfeited. Indeed, "the more faithfully this principle of the subsidiary function be followed, and a graded hierarchical order exist between various associations, the greater will be both social authority and social efficiency, and the happier and more prosperous

the condition of the commonwealth." Thus the authority of the State will be reinstated, "the supreme arbiter, ruling in kingly fashion far above all party contention, intent only upon justice and the common good."

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## The State and International Relations

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IN DEALING with such a subject as the present it is exceedingly difficult for the writer to know whether, given the particular readers who will scan his work, he is proving propositions which they are not prepared to admit except at the point of argument, or whether he is forcing in an open door; whether he is convincing them of truth or wearying them with truisms. Let it therefore be said at the outset that the writer is used to an environment, a Catholic environment, in which some of the views he will put forward are vigorously challenged or silently ignored. It will be clear, moreover, that these ideas run counter, more or less, to various ideologies and "isms" that are current in other environments—*étatisme*, socialism, ultra-modernism, *racisme*. That must be his excuse for seeming to insist upon the obvious.

What is the State? I take it to be civil society politically organized within a given area under a single sovereign authority.<sup>1</sup> It may, like the States of India, Australia, or the United States, be subordinate in certain respects to a still higher authority. The Nation, on the other hand, I have ventured to define elsewhere as:

a large body of human beings, living together in a common territory, in organized social relations, and held together in a peculiar kind of spiritual oneness, brought about by many factors—physical environment, race, language, religion, history, common interests, but chiefly by common memories of historic things wrought in common and suffered in common in the past, and secondly the actual will to carry on that common life as a distinct people, master of its own destinies.<sup>2</sup>

Most of the states that have made good their claim to sovereign status claim to be also nations,<sup>3</sup> so that for most practical purposes they may be referred to indifferently as nations or as states.

Now what is the *raison d'être*, the end and purpose, of the State? According to what is, I think, the common teaching of Catholic philosophers it is the *bonum commune temporale*, which is explained to mean the ensemble

of the conditions which are necessary so that its members or subjects may attain true natural well-being and happiness subordinate to their ultimate end or destiny.<sup>4</sup> It is just here that all the secular theories of the State diverge from the Catholic. That awkward question of man's ultimate end and, therefore, of the real meaning of his life here below comes in to spoil everything. All the fine theories fall to pieces if you will insist on bringing God into the business. But, unhappily for the theories, God cannot be left out. And even man must be considered, not as the secular economists and political theorists would like to fancy him, but as God made him. If you prescind from the fact of God and His relations with men, your theories are about as useful as spiders' webs. For God, even if we keep strictly within the domain of philosophy, happens to belong to the world of reality.

Thus when we come to consider the State as a moral personality, we must go on to consider it as subject to the moral order and consequently to the eternal laws of God. I say that the State must be regarded as a moral personality. To quote Père Delos, O. P., one of the foremost authorities on these questions,

the State is a "personality"—a definite, individual, living, unity; a social body composed of real factors, of individuals and groups united under a controlling authority in pursuit of their common and collective welfare; and not a mere abstraction, or a handy label to denote a crowd, a number of persons who happen to be together. . . . It is a "personality": that is to say it is aware of its purpose and is freely, with a sense of responsibility, seeking its object. It is a "moral personality." The individual is a *physical* personality, because the bond that unites his members is physical. The State is a *moral* personality, because the bond that unites its members is a moral bond, the consciousness of the common good.<sup>5</sup>

Being a moral personality the State is subject to law, and relations between states must be regulated, *mutatis mutandis*, by the same rules that govern the mutual relations of persons. In other words, they cannot be deter-



mined exclusively by economic, military, or financial considerations. They are subject to the moral law and, like the actions of persons, must be ruled by justice and charity. For, in the final analysis, we cannot escape from the fact that the State is made up of men, is ruled and guided by men. Benedict XV has expressed the principle in a sentence: "The Gospel has not one law of charity for individuals, and another for states and peoples."<sup>6</sup> Neither has it a different law of justice for individuals and for states. At the same time it must be remembered that the laws of justice and charity apply to states only to the extent to which these are personalities, and in accordance with the temporal character of their end and purpose. But if there are to be international relations and international laws, the claims of justice and charity must not be ignored.

Not only to the average cynic, but also to the uncompromising partisan of the modern nationalistic state, this talk of justice and charity as between states must seem sheer nonsense.<sup>7</sup> To the latter, a foreign state is merely a temporarily convenient ally, to be used as far as use can be made of it, and a potential enemy to be watched and held at arm's length. He has no use for Christianity in politics. But the foreigner and his state do not appear to have been excluded by Christ from the concept of the neighbor, and so we who profess to be Christians must needs accept them as such.

Lecturing, on November the fifteenth, 1934, in Dublin, Professor Arnold Tonybee, a well-known English writer on international problems, said:

This pagan worship of the parochial state preached one tremendous lie, which led to the committing of one tremendous sin. The lie was this—it said to the worshipper: "You are the brother of certain of your fellow-men who live within a certain line drawn on the face of the map. . . . You are not the brother of the rest of your fellow-men who live outside that line. . . . Towards those within the Pale you owe duties deriving from the common membership of your tribe, which is your god . . . but to all human beings outside the Pale you owe no duties. On the contrary, your duty toward your fellow-tribesmen and your tribal god may be to inflict the utmost evil upon these human outcasts and outlaws whom you call foreigners."

At the conclusion of his course of lectures he expressed his conviction that the heart of the world crisis in which we find ourselves is neither economic nor political. It is really a religious problem,

by which I do not mean a religious struggle between the higher religions. I do not mean a fight between Catholics and Protestants, or between Christians and Jews, but the struggle that you see going on openly today in Russia and Germany<sup>8</sup> (he might have added Mexico and Spain) and under the surface everywhere between all the higher forms of religion (which means here in the West, our Christian heritage, which is the chrysalis out of which our Western civilization has come) and a hostile and incompatible religion, which one may call the pagan worship of the tribe—totalitarianism.

Such views, familiar enough to certain Catholic thinkers, are not so commonly heard on the lips of non-Catholics.

But what of patriotism? objects the nationalist. Yes,

patriotism. The Christian need never fear that word, for what it stands for has ever been recognized as an essential Christian duty. But what is patriotism? Old Samuel Johnson, in his downright fashion, called it the last resort of scoundrels. He was thinking of the political "patriots" of his day and may be pardoned the *boutade*. Then and since it has been used as a cloak by self-seeking politicians. In reality it is a simple thing, beginning in love, the *amor patriae*, and ending in duty, the duty of citizenship. What is it that the patriot, or rather the ordinary man who would be surprised at being called a patriot, loves? First, the land that bore him, then the people from whom he has sprung and whose lot he shares, then that marriage of land and people which we call the Nation. That love grows, or ought to grow, from a natural instinct to conscious attachment and willing loyalty. Conscious of benefits received from the political and social institutions of his country, the citizen becomes aware of duties towards it, or at least accepts these duties as a matter of justice.

In all this there is nothing to hinder the fullest international intercourse and even friendship. The man who loves his country however deeply and even passionately does not for that reason hate other countries. Nor does he necessarily forget that there is something higher than his country, namely, mankind at large and something even higher than mankind, God.

But today instead of patriotism we have to do with nationalism in its most exclusive and intransigent form, that nationalism which for the greater part of his reign has been the object of the present Pope's anxious preoccupation. It is compounded of racial pride, worship of the national state to the eclipse of all moral and religious considerations, and hatred of the foreigner. Such a frame of mind is indeed inimical to international relations, but is it Christian or even rational? Man does not exist for the State. On the contrary, the State is merely a means to help human beings to live their lives and fulfill their destiny. No Christian, no free man, may give his unconditional, unqualified allegiance to either race or state or class. He must maintain a hierarchy of loves and loyalties—God first, speaking to him through conscience and the natural law and the Church, then his nearest kith and kin, then his fellow-countrymen and his country, then his "neighbor," and his neighbor is all mankind. Nationalism, usurping the place of a religion, and become a law unto itself, sole law to its devotees, would shatter this hierarchy. It would also render the relations of the nation with other nations difficult and precarious.<sup>9</sup>

Setting aside, therefore, this false nationalism,<sup>10</sup> what relations between any given state and other states are necessary or desirable? To answer this question fully it would be necessary to repeat much that has been excellently said in an entire library of books on this subject which have come into being since the Great War. We must confine ourselves to a bare outline. Even a comparatively superficial acquaintance with contemporary world



conditions ought to provide sufficient data to form a basis for certain conclusions. For nobody can be unaware, in the first place, of the gradual but continuous growth of relations of all kinds between the various nations. Trade and commerce there always have been, but nations have become increasingly dependent for their well-being, if not for their actual existence, on trade and commerce, export and importation. Communications by rail, steamship, inland waterways, motor transport, telegraph, aviation, radio, are linking even distant countries ever more closely, and have largely reorganized the world. Life in all civilized countries is more and more based on a common scientific and economic culture. There has been a steady growth in the number and the activities of international organizations, private and official. As regards the former "it is possible to say that they cover every field, every nook and corner of human endeavor."<sup>11</sup> In the decade 1840-1848 there were ten meetings of private international organizations; in 1900-1909 there were 985; and in the four years that preceded the War there had already been 458. The setback caused to this movement by the War was serious but temporary, and the process continues. But that is, as it were, a first stage only. It may be described as international intercourse. A further stage is international politics, which may be defined as "a form of relationship which consists of the interactions, the clashes and coincidences, among the foreign policies of the nations, and the activities among the nations to which these interactions led."<sup>12</sup> Or, in simpler terms, international politics consist of interacting foreign policies. This department of international relations need not detain us at the moment for the simple reason that it is quite inevitable. It will suffice to state what to us is a commonplace but "to the gentiles foolishness," that international politics are not exempt from the moral law.<sup>13</sup>

And this word law introduces us to a further stage in international relations—what is known as international law, "a system of general principles and detailed rules which regulates the rights and obligations of the nations one toward another."<sup>14</sup> The word law is here used in a broad sense (*jus* rather than *lex*), for in its strict meaning it implies a legislative authority and for its efficacy demands a sanction, both of which elements are absent here. But even in this broad sense the thing is meaningless unless states are to be considered as moral personalities and therefore juridical subjects. The conception of the State as an end in itself or as possessing power which is neither legally nor morally subject to limitation from outside itself destroys the very notion of international law. Yet, logically or illogically, nearly all civilized states have accepted the principle of international law.

Now sooner or later the fact of manifold and ever growing international intercourse, and still more that of international law, was bound to raise a further question—that of organs, political, juridical, administrative, and even legislative, specially created for the purpose of regulating that intercourse and of defining and administering that law.

And here there emerges a new form of internationalism—the organization of world-order. The philosophical justification for this seems clear. Just as within the state a central government is needed to keep order between individuals and groups and to see fair play for all, so, unless the world was providentially intended to be an anarchy and a chaos, some central authority would seem to be needed to keep order among the seventy sovereign states which at present possess the earth, and to see fair play all round. Such an authority need not be a superstate, that is to say, a new state distinct from all existing states and possessing direct authority over the subjects of all. It may leave inviolate the sovereignty of each state within its own territory. It may exercise or even claim no authority save what is conferred on it or imparted to it by the collectivity of states. In fact, it may depend for its functioning and for its very existence on the free consent of all, or of a majority of the states. Its decrees will then be binding only in so far as the states will have previously bound themselves to accept them as such.

Two organs of world-order, serving to some extent these purposes, exist today—the Permanent Court of International Justice, sitting at The Hague, whose functions are, of course, judicial; and the League of Nations, whose functions are administrative and quasi-legislative. To discuss the merits and demerits of these two institutions would carry us beyond the limits of this paper. I would like, however, before concluding, to make a point which will, no doubt, be obvious to my readers, but is certainly not so to the general public. The League and the Court may be mended or they may be ended. If they finally fail or are violently abolished, what is the alternative? I have already suggested anarchy. But, if that be thought too strong an expression, let us say that there will be let loose a struggle, which there will be no means of checking, between two opposing forces, on the one hand imperialism, political, economic, or even cultural, the forcible union and subjection in one state of people or sections of population hitherto independent; and on the other, cosmopolitanism, or the merging, of the individuals belonging to hitherto different nations in one nationally undifferentiated society on the basis of common interests. Neither of these tendencies is likely to prevail universally and finally because, as an author already quoted says very well: "The rock upon which both imperialism and cosmopolitanism tend to come to grief is *nationality*." But then, why not sublimate the conflict by what is, after all, not beyond the wit of man to devise or the power of man to maintain—the international organization of world-order? I have frequently heard it said, "There is but one really efficacious international world organization—the Catholic Church. All the rest are futile." Now the present writer is most fully aware of the precious contribution to international relations which the Church is capable of making wherever her voice becomes articulate and whenever that voice is hearkened to.<sup>15</sup> Let us grant that she is the greatest moral and religious power in the world and that she



has a doctrine, lofty, coherent, and above all true, for the healing of the nations. But, on the other hand, that doctrine may not have been fully grasped and worked into form by her churchmen and laymen, so that many of them are not fully equipped to take a lead in international relations. They do not sufficiently know, and allow themselves to be guided by the mind of the Church. And even if they did, there would yet remain many forms of international relations—economic and political organization, for example, which lie outside the Church's sphere. And then, must we wait till the rest of the world—Japan and Turkey, Great Britain and the United States—has come into the fold of the Church before organizing international relations on a world scale? Is it not better to go on with, and make the best of, the world organization that we have, seeing that the Church herself, at all events unofficially, has shown herself favorable to it?

## REFERENCES

- <sup>1</sup> It has been described as "the juridical being, the collective organism, which the nation, a pre-existing moral person, constitutes for the purpose of asserting its independence and satisfying its needs." But this begs too many questions and does not allow for the artificial state.
- <sup>2</sup> *The Question of Irish Nationality* (Dublin, 1913).
- <sup>3</sup> In reality their nationhood, in very many cases, calls for reserves, since they contain within their frontiers very heterogeneous elements, sometimes by no means content to accept the nationality that is thrust upon them.
- <sup>4</sup> Cathrein, Victore, S. J., *Philosophia Moralis*, Herder (Friburg, 1915), No. 516, thesis 83.

- Ryan and Millar, *The State and the Church*, Macmillan (New York, 1922), p. 195 ff., and especially p. 203 ff.
- Cahill, E., S. J., *The Framework of the Christian State*, Gill (Dublin, 1932), p. 455.
- <sup>5</sup> *International Relations from a Catholic Standpoint*, (translated from the French), Browne and Nolan (Dublin, 1931), p. 33.
- <sup>6</sup> *Pacem*, May 23, 1920.
- <sup>7</sup> Dr. John A. Ryan has clearly shown that a very large proportion of the currently accepted theories of the State are at variance with the common Catholic teaching. See *The State and the Church*, p. 208 ff.
- <sup>8</sup> But whereas Germany divides mankind racially, Russia divides it into two classes—proletariat and bourgeoisie. The latter is the hated foreigner.
- <sup>9</sup> See Carlton J. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (Macmillan, New York, 1926).
- <sup>10</sup> There is a sane and legitimate nationalism which differs from patriotism in that it attaches itself to the *nationality* rather than to the country or the State.
- <sup>11</sup> Potter, Pitman B., *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization*, Century (New York, 1929), p. 38.
- <sup>12</sup> Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
- <sup>13</sup> This is clearly stated in the joint pastoral letter of the American Hierarchy published February, 1920. See Ryan and Millar, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
- <sup>14</sup> Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
- <sup>15</sup> The rôle of the Church in international relations was magnificently set forth by Père M. S. Gillet, O. P., the present Master General of the Dominican Order in a discourse at the opening of the new Collegio Angelico in Rome, November, 1932. It was published in the *Revue des Jeunes* for March, 1933. The title is "*Nationalisme et Internationalisme*." It lies before me as I write.

## Is a Just War Possible?

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A WORLD WAR, such as the one which during four years massacred millions of men, ruined cities and countryside, and brought disorder and desolation to the whole earth, could not be gone through without deeply affecting many people and bringing to light the sentiments and ideas which were springing up in the depths of their hearts. Under the lash of this tremendous scourge, everyone began talking. Problems formerly studied only in universities were now discussed in the newspapers, and questions were put before the general public which in former times had been reserved for the secret councils of kings.

As for real monarchies, are there any left? For how many thrones were not overturned? And most of the remaining crowned heads simply reigned rather than ruled. Democracy had superseded autocracy. Every political issue held an interest for the people: they had suffered too much not to cast their vote. With the memory of dear

ones killed, and confronted by the still smoldering ruins, and the general disorganization which followed the last war they began to ask: "Is war a necessary, inevitable evil?" A treaty was even devised, the Kellogg Pact, whereby war was outlawed.

When the public at large set itself to reason, the result was a mixture of just, reasonable, and sane elements with ideas which were exaggerated, strange, absurd, and impossible. In the intellectual anarchy everywhere rampant it was only to be expected that bungling should have reached an unprecedented height. How would nations riveted to a materialism that denied all principle be able to formulate principles of conduct for peace as they did for war? For it always happens that together with a few enthusiasts who ambition the world-wide domination of their own country there is a tendency unfavorable to war which seeks to banish it from civilization. To convince ourselves of this it will be sufficient to turn our attention



for a moment to the peace congresses organized by the International Committee of Democratic Action for Peace, commonly called "L'Internationale Democratique."<sup>1</sup>

The first congress held at Paris from December 4 to 11, 1921, brought together twenty-one nations; the second was held from September 20 to October 1, 1922, at Vienna, where twenty-five nations were represented. Both these congresses had the direct approval of the Vatican. The sixth congress, meeting at Bierville, M. Marc Sangnier's own locality, found itself in a Christian atmosphere.

We must realize, therefore, that in the movement against war there are tendencies which deserve to be strongly encouraged. Certainly, it is good to diffuse throughout all nations a horror of war and the spirit of peace. The frightful evils of an unprecedented calamity which an armed conflict would unloose serve as an eloquent argument against a recourse to violence. Moreover, should not the ever increasing interdependence of nations induce them to treat one another as friends and allies? It is well to note that the Church continually exhorts all nations to peace. Recall the stirring letter written by Benedict XV on July 8, 1915, urging the warring nations to come to terms. If only they had received the wise counsels of the Pope without contempt and had heeded them! But an insane pride rejected *a priori* whatever came from the Holy See. Again, recall the magnificent words of Pius X. Asked to bless the war the Pontiff replied: "I bless peace." And the present Pope says the very same thing on every occasion that presents itself to encourage a genuine movement toward peace.

To this action, which is so important and necessary if we are to breathe the pure air of peace, is joined another, one more practical and directed to actual organization. I refer to the attempt to bring into existence institutions whose purpose it is to prevent, pacify, and settle without violence the disagreements between nations. The ideal would be the institution of a league or society of nations which would act as arbiter of all international differences with enough power to enforce its decisions. In this way the right of making war would be withdrawn from the separate nations in the same way as the right of vengeance has been taken away from individuals. War would then become exceedingly rare.

This movement, which would dissipate the vain sense of pride, of jealousy, of false honor that set men at variance and bring them only misfortune, is worthy of all encouragement. It is a movement, which, in accordance with sound reason, and in touch with reality, advocates resolute but peaceful action. There is another, however, which, without consideration, launches out into the unknown, ambitioning nothing less than the suppression of all war. This movement is made up of Socialists and Communists, whose bold and exaggerated pacifism condemns all war without investigation. As a movement it is connected with anti-capitalism. According to its followers, a war would be just only if the evils which it brought about

were compensated for by proportional advantages. An appeal is thus made to the principle of twofold effect. For, following Bertrand Russell, they say: "There is not a single evil that can be avoided by war which is as great an evil as war itself."

The argument, however, leaves itself open to this reply: It entrenches itself exclusively in the field of material prosperity. Its proponents, on the one hand, consider the temporal evils which must accrue by war to both men and property, and, on the other, the territorial or material advantages which may be expected. But neither disputes of law, as we shall presently show, nor the hope of material gain can provide an adequate motive for war. It is religion, virtue, and honor which are able, from their superior heights, to lift their voices to demand sacrifices and force into war all those who are not cowardly resolved upon moral degradation and decay. There are too many men today who are inclined to ignore these elements of a higher order which elevate human nature above mere matter. The economical concept of man does not embrace his whole nature, nor does it even express the better part.

The sworn enemies of all war, the Communists and Socialists, might advance arguments which, if well founded, would be more convincing to us. For is there not a precept of Scripture: "Thou shalt not kill"? In the first place, we must remember that this precept is contained in the Old Law, yet the Jews did not hesitate to pass sentence of capital punishment, nor to declare war. Only an abusive interpretation, therefore, can quote this text as an argument against the legitimacy of any war regardless of its cause. If such reasoning were valid, the Scriptures would have introduced an immunity into society favoring every bandit and highway robber. For the precept, "Thou shalt not kill," would apply as much to the judge who passes sentence of death as to the executioner who carries it out.

Indeed, despite its materialism, our age seems to have its mystic tastes. The counsels of Christ, forgiveness of injuries, pardon of offenses, return of good for evil, are appealed to as arguments against war: "If any man take away thy coat, give him thy cloak as well; if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other."<sup>2</sup>

Our response is an invitation to our adversaries to understand reasonably the oracles of Divine Wisdom. Christ wanted to extol in those suffering injuries a patient endurance carried to its highest degree; but He also wished that above all else order should exist in society. These sublime counsels should be practised in accordance with circumstances, and always in such a way as not to compromise the universal good. However, we have said enough of such popular sophisms; we proceed to the direct demonstration of our thesis.

Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. It guarantees to human nature the inviolability of its rights. This inviolability needs the protection of efficacious sanction. The fear is always present that the concupiscences of man's lower nature may impel him to take by force what is de-



nied to him by right. When this occurs in the case of an individual, there is a judge to stop him. But the same perverse instincts may lead to violence instigated by the rulers of a nation. What judge will prevent this disorder? This culprit recognizes the authority of no judge. The only way to preserve order is to impose it by force. Here, just force opposes injustice and so constitutes just war.

Just, therefore, will be the war of that nation which, failing all other means, defends its rights by force. In such circumstances the aggressors in contempt of all rights bear the burden of guilt, and God Himself strengthens the arm of those who rise up to punish them.

Is there any resemblance between a defensive war of this nature and an individual acting in self-defense when unjustly attacked? The similarity of the two cases is striking. In both cases there is an unjust aggression, yet with this notable difference: The only thing which the individual can justly do is repel the assailant. It is absolutely beyond his jurisdiction to wreak vengeance upon the culprit. The State, on the other hand, which declares a just war intends to punish the aggressor. It restrains the invader and inflicts upon him a justly deserved punishment.

At this point we must be on our guard against a pernicious error into which many authors have fallen. It is the error of looking upon war also as a means of settling disputes. Let us suppose that two countries lay claim to a certain piece of territory. Both are in equally good faith. Who shall decide to whom it belongs? If there were no superior tribunal, it would be decided by force. War would be declared; a war just for both sides, and the disputed territory would go to the victor. Who cannot see that a right must be proved and that its decision cannot be left to a blind force? The fact that one nation has conquered would perhaps give proof of the competency of its generals and the superiority of its armaments; but it does not convince our reason. After the war, as before, the only issue solved is that the country which is more powerful and better equipped has all the chances of success. A juridical question, therefore, cannot be solved by violence. To have recourse to it is a barbarous procedure unworthy of a civilized nation. The procedure should be: examine your reasons and have them examined by others; and before incontrovertible reasons, give way; if none are found to uphold your side, do not insist; if the reasons offset each other, compromise. An honest transaction will end litigation honorably for the two opponents. Recourse to arms, then, would only be conceivable if, relying upon a Divine intervention, we might expect a direct judgment of God. But there is no warrant for such a savage superstition.

Hence, let us remember that that is a just war which is declared against a guilty nation which persists in manifestly unjust violence. By its crime and by its obstinacy, such an offender forfeits its sovereignty not, indeed, that it may be hated, but certainly it may be punished in proportion as it is necessary for the maintenance of that peace which insures the reign of justice.

These, then, are the conditions of a just war: First, a

warranted intervention by armed force supposes a certain violation of justice. Moreover, the intervention must be proportionate to the injury done and to the evils threatened. The defense of an invaded country and the protection of the innocent afford just causes for war. Furthermore, the bond which unites all men, and the common interests which order and justice should universally inspire, do not allow the right of war to be restricted to the victim of an unjust attack. The principle of non-intervention is indefensible.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, a just war supposes an act of the public authority declaring war. There is no question here of private quarrels. A justifiable objective which endures throughout the whole war is also required, and the war must be conducted within the bounds of reasonable restraint. A nation must never allow itself to be led into reprehensible passion or the cruel pleasure of vengeance. It can neither give way to an implacable hatred and barbaric repression, nor to domineering pride or like excesses. Such, in conformity with Augustine<sup>4</sup> and Aquinas,<sup>5</sup> is the traditional teaching on the conditions that justify a war.

We may well ask ourselves if unjust attacks and the oppression of innocent parties are still possible. Considering human nature as we know it, need we say that they are possible? We should recognize that, because of uncontrolled passions, just causes of war are possible, even probable. Hence, a just war even at this very moment is also possible and even probable.

Recently, some have endeavored to make war impossible by an obstinate refusal of military service. This is the policy of the "conscientious objectors." But these objectors take their stand upon a principle which is socially untenable, a principle which would give private persons the right to pass judgment upon public measures, a right which belongs to the sovereign power. At that rate there could be neither peace nor order even in the internal affairs of the state. Everyone would manufacture his own opinions, whereas in things which are not evident, the presumption is in favor of the authorities. If the conclusions of such reasoning were followed out, how much cowardice would not conceal itself beneath the cloak of conscience to escape the burden of grave duties!

Let us, therefore, spread far and wide the spirit of peace before it is too late. Diffuse it by means of conferences and pamphlets, by mutual esteem and charity. The Church will support our effort.

To confirm an enduring peace between their two countries, Chile and the Argentine Republic erected on their borders in the Andes a magnificent monument to Christ the King. Let this inscription, carved on the pedestal, always live in every heart: "May these mountains crumble to dust sooner than see a fratricidal war."

#### REFERENCES

- <sup>1</sup> See J. Boulier, S. J., *Action Populaire*, October 7, 1926.
- <sup>2</sup> Matthew 5:39-40.
- <sup>3</sup> Pius IX.
- <sup>4</sup> *Contra Faustum*, lib. xxii, 74.
- <sup>5</sup> *Sum. Theol.*, IIa, IIae, q. 40, a. 1.



## Book Reviews

### THROUGH SPACE AND TIME

Sir James Jeans, M. A., D. Sc., Sc. D.

*The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934, \$3.00*

Sir James Jeans has written a number of books about the universe, from different points of view, and though all of them are widely read, it is a safe prediction that *Through Space and Time* will be the most popular. Not only does he dispense a wealth of information, but he has a great power of presenting it in a way that makes it intelligible and palatable to the ordinary reader. In others of his works he has taken flights into mathematics, where he is a master, and into epistemology, where he has, regrettably, shown himself to be a novice; but in this book he stays within the sphere where he is most competent and most intelligible. *Through Space and Time* is based on the Royal Institute lectures of 1933, which, theoretically at least, were "adapted to a juvenile auditory." In reality the author does not far overshoot the mark set for him. The feat of putting the latest findings of science within the comprehension of the adolescent mind is a proof of his fine power of exposition.

This story of the heavens is cast in the form of a glorified Jules Verne expedition. We first tour the earth, even penetrating into its interior, and are taken back over the route called the past for thousands of millions of years. Certain rocks in eastern Canada, veterans of prehistoric days, carry veritable watches, which have without ceasing been ticking off the years since the infancy of their wearers. At this and other points Sir James's computation of the world's age is based on the supposition that such activities as radioactive disintegration have always proceeded at the same rate as at present. Next, taking to the air, we find many interesting facts about the very air itself and about the various layers of particles both within and far beyond our atmosphere. After surveying the panorama of the skies, we land on the moon, where we find, among other marvels, that in spite of the intense cold our drinking-water quickly evaporates. Continuing our journey, we call on the various planets in turn and stop to explore the sun. From there on we must travel fast, for the distances are measured in thousands of light-years. But the reader is asked to make the journey for himself.

Not the least informational item in this book is the method of measuring stellar distances. The biggest factor here is the Cepheid variables, whose periodicity is in proportion to their intrinsic brightness, from which, when once known, their distances can be computed. This and much more up-to-the-minute information is packed into some two hundred pages. Though the present writer has often, in other reviews, found it necessary to protest against certain theories of Sir James, there is little in this book to warrant adverse criticism. Twice, indeed, he refers in identical words to the "intellectual darkness of the Middle Ages" (pp. 87, 173), and once sets down the age of the human race as 800,000 years, but these are only indications that there remain regions of knowledge which he has not yet explored. At any rate he is reasonable enough to say that "the universe has not existed forever" (p. 76). The make-up of the book is a fine example of the publishers' art, and abounds in excellent illustrations.

JAMES A. MCWILLIAMS

### TRAINING THE ADOLESCENT

Raphael C. McCarthy, S. J., M. A., Ph. D.

*The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1934, \$2.00*

The author of this outstanding work on the education of the adolescent has brought to the writing of it an unusual talent, the ability to write an accurate scientific work in language that is

both precise and intelligible. Years of study and investigation in the United States and England, supplemented by practical work among boys and in the lecture hall, enable him to speak with full authority on his subject.

*Training The Adolescent* deals with every major problem that can arise in this important field. Thorough treatment is given to the mental and emotional adjustments that are so crucial during this period of physiological change and development. And this is done in full sympathy with the instinctive idealism of maturing youth. At the same time the author understands the ordinary adult mind which feels itself so incapable of coping with problems that have long since ceased to be personally vital and have, consequently, faded into the background of consciousness.

It would be difficult to find any lacunae in the list of topics selected for analysis and discussion. Emphasis is placed on the importance of the sex instinct, its place in normal life, and its proper training. Juvenile delinquency is adequately studied both in its causes and in its remedies. Of particular value at this time is the space and care which are given to the treatment of the moral and religious training of the adolescent. And in the entire work the thesis is that the instincts and ideals of youth are never to be suppressed or thwarted. It is highly stimulating to read the intelligent demonstration of the method of utilizing to the full these powerful forces in developing a strong adult character.

There can be no doubt that the work is a valuable contribution to education and psychology. And this is true for several reasons. In the first place, it is peculiarly adapted to that group of men and women, parents and teachers, who have in hand the training of the youth of today. It is, moreover, a clear presentation of the scientific attitude of a Catholic educator. It can well be called a book of the twentieth century. Not only is it based on a philosophy of education which correctly evaluates the modern contribution to psychology, but it is upheld by the unique tradition of successful adolescent training which includes all the past centuries of our civilization.

GUY LEMIEUX

### THE COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE

Part I. Tractate 2

St. Thomas Aquinas

Translated from the Latin by Ross J. Dunn, M. A.

*St. Michael's College, Toronto, Canada, 1934, \$.90*

One of the last undertakings of St. Thomas Aquinas was the compilation of this *Compendium*. He offered it as a token of friendship to Brother Reginald of Piperno, his faithful secretary. Such a handbook of theology merits well its place in the series of translations known as the St. Michael's College Philosophical Texts. There is a need for these handy texts that are in every sense Thomistic. Those who have studied the *Summa* will find the opusculum a casual and refreshing synopsis of many of its most important sections. For the philosopher, the chapters on the Fall and its consequences hold special interest. The application of truth to life, of principle to practice must be based on the realization that the first misuse of the human will was a cataclysm resulting in chaos. Back of Aquinas, of Aristotle, of Plato, lies the Fall, but only the *philosophia perennis* recognizes this fundamental fact.

The booklet is priced at ninety cents, which seems rather high. However, the glazed paper, the fine typography, and the complete index would almost demand this price. The translation is excellent.

EUGENE P. MURPHY



